Jonathan Skinner: Empire At The Brink: A Call To Action

We stand truly at an historical juncture, with several directions mapped before us, and several more unknown. Yesterday's protests demonstrated an immense will for peace around the world, a growing sense "the people" have had enough. While immensely inspiring, the moment also calls for a clarity of mind, to assess the powers before and behind us, as well as within, and the road ahead. We must not underestimate the technological and ideological behemoth massed at the borders of Iraq and lodged in the minds of the men who command it.

At the same time as free (and some not-so-free) countries around the world allowed their citizens to mass in peaceful protest, the forces of liberalization—manifested in the superiority of American air, ballistics and communications power—appear ready to take a calculated risk with liberalism's next logical step across the globe. (I discuss the largely symbolic, though still significant, distinctions between "liberalism" and "imperialism" below.) To wit: if American and British (plus any other willing coalition's) troops are "met in Baghdad by Iraqis lining the street in celebration," then Blair and Bush's increasingly-reviled faces will enjoy a dramatic and successful makeover (Schell). Even North Korea, with its fledgling nuclear weapons program, or Iran, with its intractable fundamentalist regime, will be unable to resist a seemingly implacable forward march of history.

The strategy is one of three-step brinkmanship:

1) overwhelming force is massed, preferably by a unanimous international coalition, so persuasively that the resisting regime finally backs down and goes into exile;

2) barring that, the regime is isolated (as in Kosovo) and the air and communications environment so dominated by the "liberating" forces that the regime implodes under popular pressure;

3) when this strategy fails (as, debatably, in Iraq), an invasion becomes necessary to remove the regime by force.

The U.S. and its key UN (as well as NATO) partners do not disagree on the fundamentals of this strategy: the differences are of timing, and of which of the three steps at present to push (though there is an understandable reluctance on the part of the allies to allow a unilateral U.S. progression to step three, which reluctance I discuss at length below). The U.S., Britain and a handful of European allies with little to contribute and much to gain from supporting the effort, are clearly pushing for steps one and/or three. France, Germany, Russia and China, amongst others, seem to think the resources of step two have not yet been exhausted. If, in fact, warfare is increasingly a technological race to dominate the communications sphere (De Landa), then why make haste to draw blood? Can we not just step up the surveillance and monitoring (U2 fly-overs, teams of inspectors on the ground backed by troops, etc.) to the point of squeezing the life out of the Baath regime? The goal is the same—promoting democracy through the threat of "overwhelming force"—but without the risks implicit in the inherent unpredictability of warfare and the ensuing military occupation. Haven't we learned to use our guns without firing them?

The U.S. argues that steps one and two appear unlikely, if not impossible—twelve years of sanctions having only broken the Iraqi people and hardened Hussein's grip on power, rather than inspiring, as hoped, a popular revolt; and the rough ideological terrain obviously requiring oversight, deeply divided as it is between Shiite, Kurd, Sunni and secular concerns, promising little in the way of a "spontaneous" transition to democracy. But U.S.-led force has another, more intrinsic reason for having no options but step three: until tested in the battlefield, the U.S. will not truly be able to "deploy" its intended domination of the global communications sphere (De Landa). The U.S. will not decisively have demonstrated to the world its undisputed military-technological superiority (à la Hiroshima and Nagasaki—cf. Ullman; Afghanistan was a start but also disappointingly easy in its initial phase), and it will not be able to progress to the next stage of research and development without testing its innovations in the field.

Just as Gulf War I was, in the main, a showcase for the new technology of "smart bombs," Episode II promises to open a new theatre of digitized "real time" command-to-operations communications and space-based, as well as autonomous ("intelligent") artillery operations:

If they do attack Iraq, U.S. commanders would have an unprecedented view of the battlefield, provided by a network of spy satellites at 400 miles in space, Global Hawk reconnaissance drones loitering at 65,000 feet, manned JSTARS aircraft with moving-target indicator radar at 40,000 feet and Predator drones with video, infrared and radar sensors at 20,000 feet, all feeding data back to command centers and, in some cases, directly to combat aircraft. (Ricks and Loeb)

The U.S. Administration has to toe a line between minimizing civilian casualties, and maximizing the overwhelming effect of the new technology ("Shock and Awe"): not an easy line to walk (Ullman et al). The risks are great—on the side of U.S. forces, with inevitable glitches in the technology on which these forces are increasingly dependent, including new vulnerabilities implicit in open architecture cyberware (a trade-off for stability), and with increasing strain and fatigue on "volunteer" human resources stretched thin and worked to the breaking point (De Landa, Ricks and Loeb); on the Iraqi side, with the question of Hussein's willingness to use whatever stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons he does harbor on his own people and/or the invading forces, if pushed, plus his demonstrated willingness to use his own people as "human shields" for military targets—but the risks of inaction, of failing to complete the step to global communications hegemony, are, by this zero-sum logic of military dominance, far greater.

Whether this is a dominance of "liberalism" or "imperialism" in part depends on success in patching over an increasingly evident mid-Atlantic rift: while in some respects the disagreement with France, Germany, Russia and China is one of means, in other respects it signals a potentially far more serious rift. As Jonathan Schell argues in his latest piece for Harper's on the "futility of war," the closest historical analogue for the present moment would be not, as is generally argued in camps both for and against the war, 1938, but, rather, 1945—in particular, the period between the drafting of the outlines of a U.N. Charter at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization in April of that year, and the destruction of Hiroshima on August 6. U.S. deployment of the atomic bomb effectively rendered the U.N., which came into existence on October 24, 1945, irrelevant as a governing body. Today, the United States' rival powers (rival being a very relative term here) understandably hope, however quixotically, to forestall as long as possible a decisive U.S. victory in the race to "space-based" military hegemony. France, for example, is currently working on its own versions of the new high-powered "microwave" weaponry the U.S. reportedly will test out in a war on Iraq.

Europe would like to perpetuate the '90's facade of a "liberal" coalition that at the same time enables a sharing of its de facto imperial benefits (Anderson). In this light, Blair's stubborn embrace of the U.S. program, awkwardly reaching across the Atlantic chasm, is both a calculated realization of the inevitability of U.S. hegemony ("empire") and a "heroic" attempt to keep Europe on board, and thus, to sustain the hopes of "liberalism." In "Force and Consent" Perry Anderson has argued that the death of any democratic elements of "liberalism" went down long ago, in an effectively imperial "Americanization" of the planet sugar-coated with a palaver of humanitarian and democratizing high-mindedness; nevertheless, a unilateral (or bilateral) "preemptive" U.S. strike will still mark a critical turning point. The discourse of liberalism will be dealt a fatal blow in the "theatre of operations" as the U.S. demonstrates its unrivaled power and, more importantly, its will to use that power in flagrant disregard of the will of the international community. The "liberal" system of international alliances will be discredited, and fundamentalist or other popular resistances to U.S. imperialism will be emboldened. At the same time, a successful "liberation" of Iraq, under the new sign of empire, would bring potent viability to the notion of a Pax Americana (Anderson). The U.S. "showdown" in Iraq has significantly more to do with these kinds of calculations (outlined in The National Security Strategy of the United States) than with either Saddam Hussein or evident U.S. oil interests in the region.

To dispense with "old Europe's" liberalism does seem like madness, and the possibility of this has brought the world's liberals (who supported the bombings of Kosovo and Afghanistan) into a now-mainstream anti-war movement—but the end of liberalism is built into the logic, strategic as well as tactical, of U.S. militarization, and it is also a step impelled by frankly theocratic elements in the current U.S. administration. A conviction that the U.S. has been "chosen" to lead the world to "freedom" apparently outweighs the potentially fatal results of choosing to scrap old alliances. It is all or nothing: a brinkmanship with a fearful God where only inaction is unforgivable. What matters is to assume the righteous cause; the righteous who lose themselves, or the world, in the process, will be forgiven; but the righteous will prevail, confident in their faith—or so the screed goes. In many respects, the fate of the world hangs on the outcome of an old ideological debate internal to the dominant "culture" of the United States . . . between the "moral majority" and its more secular counterparts. It is a debate that may already have been decided in the elections of 2000 and 2002. The economics of U.S. militarization also have a large role to play in the outcome. Strains internal to the military as well as on an already precarious U.S. economy, of a $1 billion-per-day deployment, are tremendous and cannot be sustained for long (Ricks and Loeb). All of these factors—a militarized strategy for global dominance, extremist theocratic tendencies within at least two, if not all three branches of the U.S. government, and the material momentum of military buildup itself—come together in a decision for military action in Iraq; all that holds the U.S. back are the liberal interests of international backing and (which is part of this) some friction provided by an alliance with the Blair administration—a friction which may become more apparent as the U.S. moves toward decisive action.

Or is that all that holds the U.S. back? Popular manifestations of opposition to U.S. imperialism around the world are the largest they have been in thirty years, dwarfing the anti-globalization protests of the '90's, and this movement is just getting underway. If such opposition is merely a drag on an inevitable U.S. attack, and if the U.S. calculation succeeds with even the moderate success that has been encountered in Afghanistan, then such popular opposition will swiftly evaporate. (It would be interesting to know how many of this weekend's protesters would support a multilateral operation in Iraq.) If, however, a U.S. operation in Iraq encounters any serious setbacks, then popular opposition could become full-scale. Dissension if not outright mutiny within the U.S. military is even possible. Finally, if popular dissent is earnest about actually stopping the U.S. military machine before it goes to the brink, then several questions need to be asked up front—all posed under the general rubric of asking whether, indeed, "the people have the power."

1) As I have already asked, to what extent are the current demonstrations a continuation of the critique of "liberalism" manifested in the pre-9/11 "anti-globalization" protests? Or is the much-celebrated, new ideological diversity of these protests, at its mainstream core, largely a response to the threat of unilateral U.S. sabotage of that status quo?

2) To what extent was the "velvet revolution" across Central and Eastern Europe (as well as peaceful revolutions in other parts of the globe) a "flowering," as Jonathan Schell claims, of "liberal democratic" nonviolent action? Or was it, as U.S. hardline strategists obviously believe, a gift of the U.S. "defeat" of the Soviet Union through economic, military and technological might? The official line is, of course, a bit of both. But nonviolent activists in the U.S. would do well to break that history down and assess the odds, as they move forward with actions modeled on such precedents. The same goes for the much-invoked examples of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Nelson Mandela.

3) Demonstrations have so far been "legal" or "permitted" and the authorities have, in the main, handled protestors with kid gloves. An effective campaign of nonviolent "non-cooperation" will, when push comes to shove, inevitably involve mass civil disobedience (and mass arrests). In what way will the new tools (cf. USA PATRIOT Act, "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism") of what is now effectively a U.S. police state be applied to such demonstrators? What is the critical mass that would deter authorities from locking up or otherwise silencing dissenters, and is such a mass attainable? What support could U.S. dissenters count on from the international community?

4) The odds of popular revolution are strengthened by a perhaps unintended side-effect of communications technology: the possibility for instantaneous coordination around the planet. This weekend's rallies—millions of people marching in the U.S., South Africa, Ireland, Scotland, England, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, Austria, Italy, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraine, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Brazil, Mexico and a host of other countries—were coordinated in less than five weeks. The popular will for peace, a collective assertion that the zero-sum game of military conflict is a dead-end for the planet, seems to cut across many ideological and cultural barriers. Have these new circumstances even begun to be exploited? How much can the "unpredictable" nature of the new, asymmetrical global terrain be counted on?

U.S. military brinkmanship thus operates in at least two directions at once. It seems ready to dissolve old liberal alliances like the United Nations or even NATO, but it also may be provoking a popular solidarity across the globe, the likes of which have never been seen before. For those who oppose U.S. imperialism, the riskiest course of action is inaction, to "wait and see" what happens in Iraq. The uncertainties of that venture are terrifying; but the worst possible, and most likely, outcome would be a swift and successful victory for the U.S. (Anderson). A fiasco would be second worst, entailing possibly dire consequences but also new room for change (the "things have to get much worse before they get better" outlook).

The popular will for peace needs to be tested and encouraged by a clear education in the likely scenarios and the long-term issues at stake, which includes a frank discussion of the undersides of a Pax Americana and/or "liberal" democracy, along the lines of the "anti-globalization" critiques vocal just two years ago— foregrounding environmental, labor and social justice, as well as human rights, issues. And that momentum thus clarified, spurred by the U.S. administration's brinkmanship, needs to be rallied to fearless and overwhelming nonviolent force—something along the lines of a national strike. Otherwise it will remain merely symbolic if the U.S. succeeds in Iraq, or unprepared in the case of a disastrous outcome.

At this very moment we are living a critical historical juncture; the seeds of the future are latent right now in the actions of each and every human being on this planet. The moment is not lost on violent militarized states and terrorists; will the powerful forces of nonviolence, for their part, allow this uncertain moment to slip by? Last weekend's outpouring was a call to get in the streets and stay in the streets, and not to shrink from power when it comes marching with its clubs and its chemicals. I, for one, do not intend to be a spectator, to let the dogs of war have the upper hand—while the rest of us sit around, to "wait and see" what will "happen" on TV. Do you?

Jonathan Skinner
SUNY at Buffalo, Poetics
February 16-17, 2003

WORKS CONSULTED

Anderson, Perry "Force and Consent," New Left Review 17, Sept-Oct 2002

De Landa, Manuel War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books: NY, 1991

Ricks, Thomas E. and Vernon Loeb "Unrivaled Military Feels Strains of Unending War; For U.S. Forces, a Technological Revolution and a Constant Call to Do More," Washington Post, Sunday, Feb. 16, 2003

Schell, Jonathan "No More Unto the Breach: Why War is Futile," Harper's March 2003

The National Security Strategy of the United States. Winterhouse Editions: Falls Village, CT 2002 (PDF version available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html)

The daily newspapers: especially The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The UK Guardian.

Ullman, Harlan K., and James P. Wade, with L. A. Edney et al. Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Washington, DC: National Defense Univ., 1996
(www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html)

USA PATRIOT Act, "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism" (HR 3162)
(www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/patriot.pdf)

Posted by Brian Stefans at February 20, 2003 03:11 PM